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SUBJECT: Positive Use of CIA Intelligence

A primary objective of foreign intelligence collection is, of course, to keep one's government informed of all matters which may affect its security and well-being. This objective is for the most part passive, however, and the Central Intelligence Agency believes that its product should on occasion be used in a positive manner to protect U.S. interests abroad. Incoming intelligence reports are assessed for this purpose and when the passage of an item to another government may help to prevent an outbreak of hostilities, suppress a dangerous situation, or safeguard our or their citizens, CIA often will decide to pass it.

Attached are a few examples of these actions.

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Tab #3 to be added
Saturday morning

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Bill:

25X1A We've carefully read drafts of the Cooper, [redacted], and Bross papers on covert action and provide here a summary of their positions.

25X1A It may be helpful for you to be sensitive to the various points made (they may prompt specific questions from the Commissioners).



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(c) From time to time the Government Operations Committees particularly on the House side have insisted on a right of congressional oversight of the economy and efficiency with which the Agency conducts its activities. Up to now the issue has not been joined, essentially as a result of our voluntary cooperation with their various investigations or informal handling between committees. Chairman Holifield has been generally supportive of the Agency position. Mr. Moorhead and Mr. Moss being most interested in asserting some type of jurisdiction.

(d) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, over recent years has pressed to extend its jurisdiction over intelligence activities through the efforts to establish the overall authority abroad of State, which it oversees, and to include broad limitations on funding of programs principally administered by CIA.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. 1947 through early 1950's - Oversight was benign.

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(a) Controlled by strongly entrenched congressional leadership and senior chairmen.

(b) Cold war psychology--rank and file not pre-disposed to interference.

(c) On the appropriation side, the basic concern was--do you have enough money?

2. Late 1950's

(a) Record of infrequent briefings of oversight committees leads to Senator Mansfield's initiative for Joint Committee (defeated in 1956 by vote of 59 to 27, with 12 original sponsors opposing the resolution).

(b) Sputnik era triggered wider congressional interest in Agency information on the Soviet threat. Agency initiated program of debriefing members of Congress who had travelled abroad, inviting them to visit Agency facilities and on occasion field installations.

3. Early 1960's

(a) The Agency furnished intelligence briefings to a number of committees including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Soviet nuclear energy program, and general intelligence briefings to House Foreign Affairs and

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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet space
program briefings to the House Science and Astronautics

Committee and Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences

Committee, and Soviet military posture briefings to the full
Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittee
of House Appropriations.

(b) Pressure continued to grow for a Joint Intelligence
Committee which spurred the CIA Subcommittee of House
Armed Services to examine Agency activities rather intensively.

(c) Chairman Vinson appointed Representative Paul J.
Kilday as Chairman of the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed
Services with the mandate to give CIA more attention.

(d) The "Soviet Missile Gap" argument in the 1960
Presidential election spurred further interest in the Agency's
intelligence product.

(e) The U-2 flight of Gary Powers over the Soviet
Union and the Bay of Pigs invasion heightened congressional
debate and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 refocused attention
on the Agency's capabilities.

(f) Reflecting Senator Russell's growing responsibilities
for appropriations matters, sessions of the CIA Subcommittee

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of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations were held in joint session. -- Even so by 1965 Agency briefings of these Subcommittees rose to 34 as contrasted with 9 the previous year.

4. Late 1960's

(a) In 1966, the Foreign Relations Committee reported a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence with Senator Russell defeating the move by 61-29 on jurisdictional grounds.

(b) In 1967 the Agency undertook a programmed effort to contact and brief all new members of Congress on the Agency.



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(d) In 1969 the Agency's intelligence product came to the front again on the ABM system leading to a closed session of the Senate to discuss the classified aspects of the subject including data provided by the Agency.

(e) Legislative initiatives were beginning to be proposed in an effort to circumscribe executive action through CIA principally in Southeast Asia.

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...we have been able to carry on an intelligence program effectively which has been worth to us billions and billions of dollars. Now we are going to abandon the idea of keeping these figures from being disclosed, then, in my humble opinion, we might as well abolish the agency. It would be like saying, in effect, that we do not want this secret intelligence after all, that we do not need it, and that we will abandon it.

We will pay an awful price for that. I am familiar with the CIA budget. I can satisfy most any Senator in the cloakroom, talking to him some about this, but I will publicly say that it is a clean budget and they have justified many times over the expenditure of the money. "

Senator Pastore: " . . .

We have to know what they are doing. As we can know what we have to do in order to guarantee the security of our own country.

So we cannot come out here and tell the whole world, "We spent \$1 billion or \$2 billion for the Central Intelligence Agency." What does that mean to anyone else, except that perhaps some people think they are spending too much. And the minute the question is asked where they are spending it we are in serious trouble.

So what happens to your children and my children, Mr. President? What happens to you when you go home tonight? What happens tomorrow? What happens to the security of our country? Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I would like to tell the public everything it is possible to tell them. I believe in that. I have been in public life continually for 40 years. I believe in the right of the public to know. But I certainly would not come to the floor of the Senate and tell you, Mr. President, how to put together an atom bomb. I would not tell you that. I would not tell you how far our nuclear subs are able to travel; I would not tell you how we can detect an enemy sub; and I would not tell you how they might detect ours. I would not tell you that. Why would I not tell you that? I would not tell you that because the minute I told you that I would jeopardize the future of your children.

I have sat down with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Proxmire), the Senator from California (Mr. Cranston), to find a solution, and I have sat down with Mr. Colby, who is a great American. He said, "Please do not do this. If you want to make my job easier, please do not do this." I cannot sit there after that admonition and exhortation and turn around and say, "Mr. Colby, I do not believe what you have to say." If I believed that for 1 minute, I would say, "You ought to give up your job." . . . "

rise to commend the Senator from Rhode Island and to associate myself fully with his comments. The Senator pointed out very properly that the Central Intelligence Agency has in the past engaged in activities that have been looked upon by certain Members of the Congress as undesirable; but I want to make it clear that every one of those activities had been ordered by a President. The Central Intelligence Agency does not just engage in activities for the love of work. I know that the Central Intelligence Agency, during the Kennedy years and the Johnson years, was engaged in activities in Laos—

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is possibly the most important agency in this Government. By and large, it is made up of people who are competent, able, and who have served this country well and faithfully. To be sure, there are times when it has engaged in activities, as we have said, that are looked upon with suspicion; but I think it would be folly for us to publicize all of its activities, to publicize the amounts it receives, particularly when there are ways and means within this body and within the other body of Congress to supervise it and to keep a check rein upon it.

I had the privilege of serving on the National Security Council, and I want to tell my colleagues that the Central Intelligence Agency was the most accurate and effective instrument of Government for that council. Its reports were most accurate, and had we followed the advice of the Central Intelligence Agency in many areas, we would have been better off, but at least it was there.

But just as surely as we are in this body today debating whether or not we ought to have a release of the figure, next year it will be whether it is too big or too little, and then it will be what is in it. Then when we start to say what is in it, we are going to have to expose exactly what we have been doing in order to gain information; for example, years ago as to where the Soviet Union was building its nuclear subs and the kind of nuclear subs they were. I saw that material in 1965—how far they were along, what their scientific progress was. I do not think it would serve the public interest for all of that information to have been laid out. It would have destroyed our intelligence gathering completely.

But let us bear in mind that it is not
to have a security intelligence agency. We
cannot have it with national publicity
on what it does, how it does it, and how
much it spends here, or how much it
spends there. . . . "

Senator Stennis: " . . .

On my responsibility to my colleagues,
they in CIA keep a clean house. They
have had a conservative operation dollar-
wise and have accounted for the money
in a splendid way. That has been true
without exception. There has been no
great spillage of money or great extrava-
gances, and not one bit of scandal or
odor of any kind. . . . "

Senator Thurmond: " . . .

I believe that our Nation is unique in
the attention its legislature has given to
specifying and circumscribing the activi-
ties of the agency designated to perform
its foreign intelligence mission. . . . "

Senator Proxmire: " . . .

Mr. President, the purpose of the
amendment which I am offering now is
to provide that the overall figure for the
intelligence community as a whole, not
broken down but the overall figure,
would be made available, so that the tax-
payers of this country would have some
idea of how much, how many billions of
dollars—and it is billions of dollars—
are going for intelligence efforts by our
Government.

Now just what would this tell our ad-
versaries? They would not know if it all
went to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the
NSA spent most of the money, or the Air
Force.

How about yearly fluctuations? Say for
example, that the budget went up 10
percent in 1 year. What what they con-
clude? That manpower was more expen-
sive? That the CIA was spending more
for Laos? That the DIA had bought a
new computer division? That NSA was
hiring more people? They would know
nothing. . . . "

Senator Hughes: " . . .

The threat will come from losing control on the inside. If maintaining that control requires an ounce of risk, then I think we should be prepared to take that ounce of risk in at least letting us see publicly and the people see publicly whether we are spending \$3 billion, \$7 billion, or \$90 billion, and how we are concealing it and hiding it, and if we are protecting ourselves from the inside as well as from the outside.

I think that ounce of risk, if it exists, is worth taking, and I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for yielding. " . . .

Senator Jackson: " . . .

In summary, our foreign intelligence service arises out of an act of Congress and all of its activities are closely scrutinized by a number of representative members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is how we have resolved the balance between the needs of an open society and the needs for a secret foreign intelligence service. I certainly do not think that this is the time to unbalance the situation as I am confident enactment of the proposed amendment would do.

Senator Young: " . . .

I know there is great interest in the public knowing everything possible, but I think there are some things that should be kept secret for our own security. "

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RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

§ 735.

Rule XI.

record vote is demanded. The result of each rollcall vote in any meeting of any committee shall be made available by that committee for inspection by the public at reasonable times in the offices of that committee. Information so available for public inspection shall include a description of the amendment, motion, order, or other proposition and the name of each Member voting for and each Member voting against such amendment, motion, order, or proposition, and whether by proxy or in person, and the names of those Members present but not voting. With respect to each record vote by any committee on each motion to report any bill or resolution of a public character, the total number of votes cast for, and the total number of votes cast against, the reporting of such bill or resolution shall be included in the committee report.

The first part of this paragraph was derived from Sec. 133(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) and made part of the standing rules on January 3, 1953, p. 24. The requirements that committee roll calls be subject to public inspection and that the committee report on a public bill or resolution include the vote thereon, were added by Sec. 104(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140) and made a part of the rules on January 22, 1971, p. —, H. Res. 5.

(c) All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and files shall be kept separate and distinct from the congressional office records of the Member serving as chairman of the committee; and such records shall be the property of the House and all Members of the House shall have access to such records. Each com-

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RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Rule XI.

§ 735.

mittee is authorized to have printed and bound testimony and other data presented at hearings held by the committee.

This provision from Sec. 202 (d) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) was made a part of the standing rules January 3, 1953, p. 24.

(d)(1) It shall be the duty of the chairman of each committee to report or cause to be reported promptly to the House any measure approved by his committee and to take or cause to be taken necessary steps to bring the matter to a vote.

(2) In any event, the report of any committee on a measure which has been approved by the committee shall be filed within seven calendar days (exclusive of days on which the House is not in session) after the day on which there has been filed with the clerk of the committee a written request, signed by a majority of the members of the committee, for the reporting of that measure. Upon the filing of any such request, the clerk of the committee shall transmit immediately to the chairman of the committee notice of the filing of that request. This subparagraph does not apply to a report of the Committee on Rules with respect to the rules, joint rules, or order of business of the House or to the reporting of a resolution of inquiry addressed to the head of an executive department.

(3) If, at the time of approval of any measure or matter by any committee (except the Committee on Rules) any member of the committee, gives notice of

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CIA SUBCOMMITTEES

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

✓ John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) ✓ Milton R. Young (R., N. Dak.)
John O. Pastore (D., R.I.) Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebr.)

SENATE ARMED SERVICES

CIA SUBCOMMITTEE

John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Chairman
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) Strom Thurmond (R., S. C.)

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.), Chairman
F. Edward Hebert (D., La.) William G. Bray (R., Ind.)
Melvin Price (D., Ill.) Leslie Arends (R., Ill.)
O. C. Fisher (D., Texas) Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS

"SPECIAL GROUP"

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman
Jamie L. Whitten (D., Miss.) William E. Minshall (R., Ohio)
Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.) Elford A. Cederberg (R., Mich)

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DATE	COMMITTEE	MEMBERS	SUBJECT
April 1964	House	Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000040002-2	25X1C
May 1964	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	
19 May 1964	CIA Subcommittees Senate Appropriations & Armed Services	Russell Saltonstall Hayden Stennis Young	
July 1964	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	
August 1964	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	
25 March 1965	CIA Subcommittees Senate Appropriations & Armed Services	Stennis Saltonstall Young	
25 March 1965	CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services	Rivers Philbin Hebert Price Hardy Bennett Bates Arends O'Konski Bray	

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15 April 1965 CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations Mahon
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Bow
Lipscomb

11 August 1965 Special Group, House Appropriations Committee Mahon
Andrews
Lipscomb
Bow

14 September 1965 CIA Subcommittees of Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Russell
Stennis
Hayden
Young

21 September 1966 CIA Subcommittees of Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Russell
Symington
Stennis
Saltonstall
Young
Smith

September 1968 House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen

13 October 1970 CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations Mahon
Andrews
Bow
Minshall

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DATE	COMMITTEE	MEMBERS	SUBJECT
November 1970	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	25X1C
19 November 1970	Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriations	Ellender Stennis Pastore Mansfield Young Smith Allott Hruska Symington Jackson Thurmond	
11 June 1971	Intelligence Operations Sub-Committee of Senate Appropriations	Ellender Stennis Young	
3 February 1972	Defense Subcommittee, House Appropriations	Mahon Sikes Whitten Flood Addabbo McFall Minshall Rhodes Davis Wyman	
May 1972	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	

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DATE	COMMITTEE	MEMBERS	SUBJECT	SUBJECT
January 1973	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen		
16 January 1973	Defense, Military Construction Subcommittees, House Appropriations	Mahon Sikes Whitten Flood Addabbo McFall Flynt Minshall Rhodes Davis Wyman Patten Long Hansen McKay Cederberg		
13 March 1973	CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations	McClellan Pastore Hruska Symington Jackson Thurmond		
13 March 1973	Same	McClellan Hruska Symington Church (invitee)		

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DATE	COMMITTEE	MEMBERS	SUBJECT
January 1973	House & Senate Appropriations	Chairmen	
16 January 1973	Defense, Military Construction Subcommittees, House Appropriations	Mahon Sikes Whitten Flood Addabbo McFall Flynt Minshall Rhodes Davis Wyman Patten Long Hansen McKay Cederberg	
13 March 1973	CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations	McClellan Pastore Hruska Symington Jackson Thurmond	
13 March 1973	Same	McClellan Hruska Symington Church (invitee)	

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DATE	COMMITTEE	MEMBERS	SUBJECT
11 October 1973	Intelligence Operations of Senate Appropriations	McClellan Young	
11 October 1973	Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs	Fascell Rosenthal Harrington Steele Whalen	
16 October 1973	Special Group of House Appropriations	Mahon Whitten Sikes Minshall Cederberg	
26 November 1973	Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of Senate Foreign Relations Committee	McGee Sparkman Muskie Aiken Case Scott Pearson	
22 April 1974	Subcommittee on Intelligence of House Armed Services	Nedzi	

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TAB

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2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
November 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR Committee II: Intelligence

Amb. Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Rep. Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Mr. Arend D. Lubbers
Dr. David M. Abshire
Mr. William J. Casey

SUBJECT: Plans for November 18/19 Meeting

The following schedule is suggested for the meeting of the Intelligence Committee on Monday, November 18 and Tuesday morning, November 19.

There will be a classified discussion of clandestine operations beginning at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, November 18, in the Conference room of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Room 340, Old Executive Office Building). Please use the 17th Street entrance and ask for Mr. Byers.) The first order of business will be a closed briefing from the CIA on clandestine operations. At 11:15, there will be a discussion of the Commission's analytical issue papers on clandestine operations (see below). An informal sandwich lunch will be served in the Conference room from 1:00-2:00, followed by an examination of the "All-Source Study" prepared by [redacted] and [redacted]. Because of its highly classified nature, this paper will have to be read in the PFIAB Conference room.

On Tuesday, November 19, from 9:30 a.m. until 12:30, the meeting will be held in the Conference room (third floor) of the Commission offices at 2025 M Street, to prepare findings and recommendations on covert action and other aspects of clandestine operations.

Enclosed herewith are analytical issue papers concerning clandestine operations expressly written under contract for the Commission:


- a. "Intelligence Functions" by [redacted] - an overview of intelligence that touches on clandestine activity.

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Subj: Plans for Nov--18/19 Meeting

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- b. "Clandestine Operations" by [redacted] a research paper specifically on covert action and other aspects of clandestine operations. 25X1A
- c. "American Foreign Policy and Covert Intelligence" by [redacted] -- a think-piece focused primarily on some organizational alternatives for conducting covert action.
- d. A "commentary" on the [redacted] papers by [redacted] 25X1


Francis O. Wilcox
Executive Director

Enclosures